



IST-SET-198 Research Symposium (RSY) on
"Quantum Technology for Defence and Security"

Disruptive Sdn seCuRE communicaTions for eurOpean defeNse
EDIDP-CSAMN-SDN-2020 – SDN for defense use including the development of products and technologies




03/10/2023 (E1 session)

Catarina Bastos



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WHY QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION?



MILITARY NETWORKS



STRONG, RELIABLE AND SECURE CIS network infrastructures

❑ **SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS (SDN):**

- More agile, flexible, easier to manage and to re-configure, and to support interoperation among diverse networks.
- **Challenging**: tactical networking and sharing information in dynamical environment using SDN.
- **SDN Flexibility**: allows integration of disruptive technologies like **Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)**.

DISCRETION: quantum-enabled SDN architecture uniting under the same management the quantum and classical communications.

DISCRETION OBJECTIVES

DISCRETION






- ❑ Design and propose an architecture of an SDN for secure communication which can evolve in time according to Member States operational needs and ambition;
- ❑ Introduce quantum technologies in Europe as a mechanism for secure share of information between Member States Defence;
- ❑ Development of HW + SW for distribution of keys and also for generation of keys (using QKD) for military applications;
- ❑ Support PESCO project EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub;







DISCRETION objectives aligned with relevant technological building blocks for Cyber Defence:

- Explore similarities and differences between cyber operations and electronic warfare, including SDN;
- Quantum computing and cryptography with cyber implications.

RED-BLACK NETWORK PARADIGM




DISCRETION WORKFLOW, SCENARIOS AND USE CASES





Military scenarios pose an additional challenge for operation across different security perimeters



QKD Control and associated channels, **QKD nodes** have been tagged as red network elements:




- Separate QKD plane for the black network
- Isolation between, Service Plane SDN Apps and SDN-QKD introduces constraints to network automation and programmability of the black network.
- Ongoing analysis of existent trade-offs to provide an ample degree of **programmability without compromising security.**
- SDR interacts with DISCRETION system in the setup phase.**

SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK




SDN Control Plane:
Coordinates Data,
Optical and QKD
Network Planes

Service Plane:
Represented by the logical
interconnection of military
sites through the Data Plane



Data Plane:
Supports Service Plane
secure communications

QKD Plane:
Logical point-to-point
interconnection of QKD
devices enabling the
generation of symmetric
quantum keys




Optical Plane:

- supports QKD Plane
- serves the optical connectivity among QKD devices

CONTINUOUS VARIABLE - QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NODES




Based on technology already developed in the Lab:




Quantum Secure

ETSI GS QKD 015

QKD node: set of QKD modules that implement hardware, firmware supporting the CV-QKD technology.



QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION ARCHITECTURE




Through cipher machines for data protection

- ❑ **Network segregation**, enabling real-time data protection with hardened and customized systems;
- ❑ Using key material provided by a **Key Management System (KMS)** integrating the SD-QKD plane and pre-shared keys;
- ❑ **Strict Red-black architecture of the military networks** providing the required level of security and segregation.



DISCRETION: PRELIMINARY DESIGN




❑ Inter-domain federated Architecture:

- Network sovereignty on each administrative domain (e.g. country)
- Communications established according to previously agreed SLAs allowing the different members of a coalition to share information and network resources without losing control over their own networks.


❑ Intra-(administrative) domain hierarchical SDN architecture

- Easier control of each domain when it is provided by a specialized controller,
- Greater adaptability in multi-provider scenarios
- High available and scalable solution through distributed Domain Level Controllers.





Setup




- ✓ Connected to the **Operational SDN**
- ✓ Using **DISCRETION system for Key distribution** and remote SDR configuration
- ✓ SDRs physically connected to the network

Use Case 1: Mission Setup

- Actions for the setup scenario
- Deployment of the configuration
- Distribution of Cryptographic keyset

Mission



- ✓ **Tactical**, on the field, no guaranteed connection to operational network
- ✓ **Control plane** at the Command and Control Centre (CCC), or a SDN hierarchy culminating at the CCC.

Use Case 2: Data-based SDR control

- Closing a control loop,
- Starting with situational awareness data,
- Triggering a decision,
- Enforcing it to the SDRs

Use Case 3: Tactical key management


- Managing the security of the tactical network:
- forcing key rotation,
 - redefining groups



Why a strict evaluation for each standard?

❑ **Inter-Domain (red-black) is limited, and data cannot simply flow between boundaries.**



- Breaks some assumptions of standards
- May leak metadata across boundaries
- Cross-domain requires heavy filtering or Data-Diodes



PORTUGUESE QUANTUM COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE



□ DISCRETION technology will be integrated in the 1st segment of PTQCI





THANK YOU

<https://discretion-eu.com/>